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Evaluative conditioning (EC) is generally considered to be one of the routes via which 
likes and dislikes are acquired. We identify recent trends in EC research and speculate 
about the topics that will dominate future research on EC. Many of the recent 
developments in EC research were shaped by functional definitions of EC that refer only 
to environmental conditions, but not to mental processes and representations. These 
functional definitions stimulated the development of and debates between theories about 
the mental processes that mediate EC. These trends, as well as greater methodological 
and conceptual sophistication, inspired meta-conditional studies that aim at determining 
the conditions under which EC is characterized by certain properties. The question of 
whether EC depends on contingency awareness remains a central topic, albeit with a 
stronger link to theorizing about underlying mental processes. Other automaticity features 
have gained enhanced interest, as can for example be seen in research investigating 
whether EC is goal-independent and whether EC is resource-independent. We argue that 
future research would benefit from a sharper distinction between processes that operate 
during acquisition (i.e., when CS-US pairs are presented) and processes that operate 
during measurement (i.e., when the effects of CS-US pairings are assessed). We conclude 
with a short summary of all articles in this Special Issue, relating them to the identified 
trends in EC research. 
 
Keywords: automaticity, evaluative conditioning, functional definition, mental process 
theories  
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Many psychologists have devoted their careers to understanding the likes and 
dislikes that humans (and non-human animals) display. Understanding these evaluations 
is important not only for its own sake, but also because they are assumed to determine 
various kinds of behavior, ranging from the purchase of consumer products to the pursuit 
of potential mates. Learning more about how evaluations are acquired and how they can 
be changed could thus help us understand and control many aspects of human behavior. 
For almost four decades, evaluative conditioning (EC) researchers have examined one 
potential way of creating and changing likes and dislikes: the pairing of stimuli (cf. 
Levey & Martin, 1975). More specifically, research has shown that the liking of a 
stimulus can be increased by pairing it with positive stimuli and decreased by pairing it 
with negative stimuli (for a meta-analysis, see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, 
& Crombez, 2010).  
The aim of this article, and the Special Issue that it introduces, is to provide an 
overview of recent trends in EC research and to speculate about potential future 
developments. The need for such an update became clear to us during a recent Special 
Interest Meeting on EC that took place at Ghent University (Belgium) in December 2010. 
Whereas earlier meetings on EC focused to a large extent on whether genuine EC effects 
can be observed and on the boundary conditions of these effects (see De Houwer, 
Baeyens, & Field, 2005), the most recent meeting at Ghent University was dominated by 
lively debates about the exact nature of EC and the mental processes and representations 
that underlie the effect. Recurring questions, such as the role of conscious awareness in 
EC, are now addressed in a manner that is both conceptually and methodologically more 
sophisticated than ever. In the following section, we provide an overview of these 
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developments and current issues of debate. Expanding on this overview, we then offer 
some projections on how these trends could influence future research on EC. In the final 
section, we briefly review the articles in this Special Issue, elucidating how they relate to 
the identified trends and how they forebode future hot topics in EC research.  
 
Recent developments in EC research 
 
Defining EC 
Until recently, research on EC has been dominated by a strong empirical focus 
with little consideration of basic conceptual issues. Although early studies offered many 
valuable insights (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001, for a review), the 
communication of these findings has been characterized by inconsistent use of 
terminology. As De Houwer (2007) pointed out, different researchers conceived of EC in 
different ways, which can hamper theorizing and the interpretation of empirical findings. 
Whereas some researchers considered EC as the effect of stimulus pairings on liking, 
others conceptualized it as a mental mechanism that produces changes in liking by 
creating associations in memory. To avoid conflations between behavioral effects and 
mental constructs that mediate these effects, De Houwer argued that EC is best defined as 
an effect, that is, as “a change in the valence of a stimulus that results from pairing the 
stimulus with another stimulus” (p. 230). De Houwer‟s definition and similar 
conceptualizations (e.g., Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010) are now widely used and have 
greatly facilitated the interpretation of empirical findings and theoretical debates about 
the mechanisms underlying EC.
1
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The proposed conceptualizations of EC as an effect can be described as functional 
definitions, in that they define EC in terms of elements in the environment (stimulus 
pairings) without referring to mental processes and representations (e.g., formation of 
associative links; acquisition of propositional knowledge). The lack of reference to 
mental constructs has two important advantages (see De Houwer, 2007, 2011a). First, it 
is easier to verify whether stimulus pairings produce changes in liking than to verify 
whether certain mental constructs mediate the impact of stimulus pairings on liking. 
Second, functional definitions of EC do not restrict on an a priori basis ideas about the 
mental processes and representations that might mediate the effect of stimulus pairings on 
liking. According to functional definitions, EC as a basic phenomenon does not depend 
on whether it is explained by the formation of associative links (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006), the acquisition of propositional knowledge (e.g., De Houwer, 
2009), or any other mental mechanism (for a review, see De Houwer, 2011b). The 
question of which mental processes and representations mediate EC effects, should be 
distinguished from the question of what EC is as a basic phenomenon. Hypotheses about 
underlying processes and representations can be answered only by testing theoretically 
derived predictions about the moderators of EC. 
Despite these advantages, a number of questions can be raised about the 
functional definitions of EC that are currently available. For example, the definition 
offered by De Houwer (2007) states that changes in valence qualify as EC effects if they 
can be attributed to stimulus pairings. However, neither the term pairings nor the term 
valence change are as unambiguous as it might seem. This ambiguity has sparked several 
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debates at the 2010 meeting in Ghent. In this section, we provide a brief discussion of the 
issues that have been raised.  
 
Do effects due to pairings include priming? 
 A first ambiguity that was discussed during the meeting in Ghent is that the 
above definition might be understood to include priming effects. In a typical affective 
priming procedure, participants‟ task is to give an evaluative response to a target stimulus 
that is presented shortly after a prime stimulus (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). It can thus be argued that 
prime and target are presented in pairs. Because a valenced prime typically influences 
participants‟ evaluations of the target (e.g., how quickly or how positively they evaluate 
the target), De Houwer‟s (2007) definition of EC can be interpreted as subsuming 
priming effects: prime and target stimuli are paired and this pairing influences the 
evaluation of the target. Considering, however, that EC is a form of learning, it becomes 
clear that EC, like all instances of learning, refers to the impact of past events on current 
behavior. Hence, any definition of EC should be limited to changes in liking that are due 
to the prior pairing of stimuli. Because in priming tasks, the change in liking is observed 
during the pairing of the prime and target (i.e., at the time of the first occurrence of the 
target after the prime), there is no past pairing that can lead to the change in liking. Thus, 
there are reasons to argue that De Houwer‟s (2007) definition does not include priming 
effects. Nevertheless, one could resolve any ambiguity on this matter by modifying his 
definition in the following manner: “EC is a change in the valence of a stimulus that 
results from a previous pairing of the stimulus with another stimulus.” Note that a similar 
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clarification would have to be applied to functional definitions of other types of (classical 
and operant) conditioning. For example, fear conditioning also refers to effects of prior 
CS-US pairings and therefore has to be tested (e.g., by assessing skin conductance) in the 
absence of the US (e.g., shock). 
 
What about the effects of instructions? 
 Another issue that sparked discussions is whether changes in valence based on 
instructions about pairings should be considered as instances of EC. There are several 
possible reasons for excluding effects of instructions from the definition of EC. First, it is 
obvious that instructions about pairings are different from actual CS-US pairings, in that 
only the latter involve the physical presence of the CS and the US. A typical instruction 
only involves a statement about the co-occurrence of two stimuli (e.g., the instruction that 
the nonword „enanwal‟ will be followed by a positive picture; see De Houwer, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the words appearing in instructions about pairings 
can be argued to be CSs and USs themselves (Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). 
Hence, although the number of pairings in such instructions is typically reduced to one, 
instructions can be said to contain a single CS-US pairing.  
Another argument for rejecting effects of instructions as instances of EC is the 
fact that instructions typically involve more than a simple pairing of stimuli. In many 
cases, they also contain information about the way stimuli are related (e.g., CS is paired 
with US, CS has the same meaning as US). There are reasons to believe that this 
relational information determines the effects of instructions. For example, the sentences 
“CS1 will be paired with a positive US” and “CS1 will not be paired with a positive US” 
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both involve the physical pairings of the verbal stimuli “CS1” and “positive US”, but 
may have different effects on liking (cf. Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; 
Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008). One could, however, argue that 
many, if not all instances of EC involve relational information. It is important to realize 
that relational information about a CS-US pair can be provided not only by words (e.g., 
“is paired with”) but also by other stimuli whose learning history or current properties 
suggest a specific type of stimulus relation (e.g., Zanon, De Houwer, & Gast, 2012, this 
issue). Even the mere fact that stimuli appear together on a screen could be a cue that the 
stimuli are related in a certain way (e.g., that they belong together; Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Hence, linking the definition of EC to the absence of relational 
information would render it difficult to verify the definition because it is difficult to 
determine that relational information is actually absent in a certain situation. We 
therefore prefer to think of cues about the relation between stimuli (e.g., words, symbols, 
context) as potential moderators of the effect of stimulus pairings on liking (e.g., Fiedler 
& Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011; Zanon et al., 2012, this issue). Rather 
than excluding relational information from research on EC, we believe that our 
understanding of the impact of stimulus pairings on liking can be enriched by studying 
how cues about the type of stimulus relation moderate this impact.  
A third argument for rejecting instruction effects as instances of EC is that these 
effects might be mediated by propositional processes whereas “genuine” EC effects must 
be due to the automatic formation of associations. A major problem with this argument is 
that it requires an exclusion of all procedures in which EC effects are driven by 
propositional processes. However, this decision cannot be made merely by inspecting the 
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procedure or the behavior that is elicited by the procedure (De Houwer, 2011a). In our 
opinion, the contribution of associative and propositional processes to EC is the subject 
of empirical research and theoretical debate about the mechanisms underlying EC. 
Hence, their presence versus absence should not be used as the criterion for classifying 
changes in liking as instances of EC. As we indicated above, defining EC in terms of 
mental processes and representations would not only render it difficult to verify whether 
a change in liking is an instance of EC, but also hinder progress in our understanding of 
the mental processes and representations that mediate EC effects.
2
 
A final reason for not accepting instruction effects as instances of EC is that it 
would blur the distinction between EC and other phenomena such as persuasion. 
Persuasion can be defined as a change in liking as the result of verbally communicated 
messages (for a review, see Johnson, Maio, Smith-McLallen, 2005). EC via instructions 
would count as an instance of persuasion because it involves changes in liking as the 
result of a verbal message. A distinction between the two phenomena in terms of the 
presence or absence of verbal instructions seems relatively straightforward. For example, 
one could limit EC to cases that involve the actual presentation of stimuli pairings in a 
format other than sentences and reserve the term persuasion for all cases that involve the 
presentation of evaluative information in the form of sentences. However, questions 
could be raised about whether sentences differ in a fundamental manner from situations 
in which stimuli are presented in the presence of nonverbal cues about the relation 
between the stimuli (see Hayes et al., 2001). An alternative option is to accept a certain 
degree of overlap between instances of EC and instances of persuasion. Such an approach 
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could foster interactions between research on both phenomena, highlighting that they 
might (sometimes) be mediated by similar mental processes. 
Regardless of whether one prefers to include or exclude instruction effects in the 
conceptual definition of EC, we argue that any demarcation should be made in functional 
terms, that is, by means of elements in the environment rather than the mental constructs 
that are assumed to underlie EC effects. Moreover, we believe that it is useful to compare 
the effects of instructions with the effects of “actual” pairings irrespective of one‟s 
conceptual preference. To the extent that both display the same functional properties, 
there is reason to believe that they are due to the same underlying mechanisms (e.g., 
acquisition of propositional knowledge). However, if the two effects are characterized by 
different functional properties, any mental process account (e.g., single-process 
associative, single-process propositional, or dual-process account) would have to explain 
why instructions and “actual” pairings have different effects. Because ignoring the effects 
of instructions on liking would limit the empirical basis for theorizing about the 
mechanisms underlying EC, we think that it is useful to compare the functional properties 
of instruction effects with the ones of “actual” pairing effects.  
 
Does a functional definition include demand effects? 
 Some researchers might be worried that a functional definition that does not 
impose any restrictions on the processes by which pairings lead to a change in liking 
might not be able to distinguish genuine EC from demand effects. There are several 
possibilities for dealing with demand effects at the conceptual level. First, one could 
argue that demand effects do not involve a genuine change in liking, and thus do not 
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qualify as instances of EC. However, such a proposal begs the question of what 
constitutes a “genuine” change in liking. Although the change in liking is the one feature 
that distinguishes EC from other instances of classical conditioning (see De Houwer, 
2007), this question has received little attention in the literature on EC. Hence, any 
definition of EC has to ultimately deal with the question of what constitutes a “genuine” 
change in liking. 
Second, one could argue that changes in liking due to demand effects are genuine 
instances of EC (i.e., effects of stimulus pairings on liking), but that such instances of EC 
are due to a special type of mediating mental process (i.e., participants intentionally 
behave in a way that meets the perceived expectations of the experimenter). Empirically, 
one can exclude the operation of these processes (and thus demand effects) by removing 
the opportunity for these processes to operate. Typically, this is done by using measures 
of liking that are difficult to control. If EC is still found under those conditions, it is likely 
not due to demand. Note, however, that it is not possible to draw the opposite conclusion 
if EC effects emerge on measures that are relatively easy to control, but not on measures 
that are relatively difficult to control. After all, a null effect on the latter type of measure 
could be due to multiple factors, including low reliability of the measure (for a detailed 
discussion, see Gawronski & De Houwer, in press). Thus, claims about demand can be 
interpreted as hypotheses about mental processes, and these hypotheses imply specific 
predictions about the convergence versus divergence of measurement outcomes. To the 
extent that these predictions are disconfirmed, demand can be ruled out as a potential 
mechanism. However, demand cannot be confirmed in a positive manner, just as it is 
impossible to verify the truth of any theoretical hypothesis (Popper, 1934). From this 
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perspective, the concept of demand does not involve any problems for a functional 
definition of EC, because it is not an empirical effect that needs to be distinguished from 
“genuine” EC. Instead, it is a theoretical hypothesis about mental mechanisms that needs 
to be ruled out by investigating the boundary conditions of the observed effects (e.g., by 
comparing EC effects across different measures). 
 
Theoretic developments 
Functional definitions of EC highlight the fact that EC can in principle be due to 
any type or combination of mental processes. This insight was undoubtedly one of the 
factors that spurred recent advances in theorizing about the mental processes and 
representations that mediate EC. During the past years, the theoretical landscape of EC 
has been enriched by a number of new accounts (for reviews, see De Houwer, 2011b; 
Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010). One of them is the implicit misattribution account (Jones, 
Fazio, & Olson, 2009), which assumes that the evaluative response that is elicited by the 
US and experienced during CS-US pairings is implicitly misattributed to the CSs. This 
misattribution is claimed to produce a stimulus-response (S-R) link between the 
representation of the CS and the evaluative response. Another explanation that has been 
influential during the last years is the propositional account of EC (De Houwer, 2009; 
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). This account posits that changes in the 
evaluation of the CS are due to the acquisition and validation of propositional knowledge 
about the relation between the CS and the US. Unlike associations, propositions are 
qualified links that are represented in the form of statements about events in the world. 
Last, but not least, dual-process models of information processing postulate that EC can 
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be the result of either associative or propositional processes, with two processes being 
characterized by specific patterns of mutual interactions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2011).  
The idea that associative and propositional processes interact in producing EC 
effects fits well with a meta-conditional approach to EC. Rather than trying to identify 
general properties of EC (e.g., whether or not EC depends on contingency awareness), 
the meta-conditional approach aims to determine the conditions under which EC has 
certain properties (De Houwer, 2007). This implies that different instances of EC might 
have different functional properties (e.g., De Houwer, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2011; Jones et al., 2010). For example, instances of EC that are due to the formation of 
associative links might be independent of awareness of the CS-US contingencies, 
whereas instances of EC that are produced by propositional processes might depend on 
contingency awareness (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, in press). For example, Gawronski 
and LeBel (2008) found EC effects on both an explicit measure (i.e., evaluative ratings) 
and an implicit measure (i.e., evaluative priming) when participants were instructed to 
adopt an affective focus. However, when participants were instructed to adopt a cognitive 
focus, EC effects emerged only on the implicit, but not on the explicit measure. Similarly, 
recent research has shown that US-revaluation influences liking of a CS only when the 
CS was paired with a single US, but not when it was paired with multiple USs (Sweldens, 
Van Osselaer, & Janiszewski, 2010). These results suggest that EC is sometimes based on 
stimulus-stimulus learning and sometimes on stimulus-response learning (see also Gast & 
Rothermund, 2011a; Walther, Gawronski, Blank, & Langer, 2009). The important task 
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for future theorizing is to explain why EC effects are moderated in the observed manner 
and to generate novel predictions that could be used to test the proposed explanations. 
 
Increased methodological and conceptual sophistication 
Another important development in EC research is that newly established methods 
allow researchers to be much more precise in their conclusions from a given set of data. 
This is particularly true for research on contingency awareness where several authors 
have made important contributions to enhanced methodological and conceptual precision. 
Until recently, the relation between conscious knowledge of stimulus pairings and 
EC effects has typically been assessed at the level of the participant, for example by 
comparing EC effects of participants who remember more than half of the presented CS-
US pairings with those of participants who remember less than half (e.g. Fulcher & 
Hammerl, 2001). Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, and Yzerbzt (2007) pointed out that it is 
more precise to consider knowledge about the pairings at the level of a given stimulus 
pair. As a result, analyses at the level of stimulus pairs have largely replaced analyses at 
the level of the participant as the dominant analytical tool.  
Another important distinction is whether a participant is aware of the identity of 
the US that had been paired with a CS (identity awareness) or whether the participant 
remembers only the valence of the relevant US (valence awareness). Stahl, Unkelbach, 
and Corneille (2009) argued that valence awareness is more important than identity 
awareness in determining EC. However, some researchers raised concerns that measures 
of valence memory might not always provide a valid indication of conscious awareness 
of CS-US pairings. Specifically, a correct response on a measure of valence memory 
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might indicate actual knowledge of the CS-US pairing, but it might also reflect valence-
based guessing (Bar-Anan, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2010; Gawronski & Walther, 2012; 
Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, in press). That is, participants may use 
their conditioned (dis)liking of the CS as a cue for guessing the valence of the US it had 
been paired with. Such a strategy could artificially increase the strength of the relation 
between valence memory and EC. A recent study by Hütter et al. (in press) has made an 
important step toward resolving this problem by using multinomial modeling (Batchelder 
& Riefer, 1999) to disentangle the role of actual CS-US memory and valence-based 
guessing in EC.  
Another important concern is that conscious knowledge during the acquisition 
phase (i.e., when CS-US pairings are presented) needs to be distinguished from conscious 
knowledge during the measurement phase (i.e., when the effects of CS-US pairings are 
tested). Although this problem has been identified repeatedly in research on EC 
(Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Purkis & Lipp, 2001; Shanks & St. John, 
1994), it is still common practice to investigate contingency awareness with measures of 
recollective memory at the end of the experiment. Recently, this problem has received 
more attention, because different theoretical accounts make different predictions about 
the role of contingency knowledge during acquisition versus measurement (Bar-Anan et 
al., 2010; Gast, De Houwer, & De Schryver, 2012, this issue; Gawronski & Walther, 
2012). Although measures of recollective memory are well suited to assess participants‟ 
conscious knowledge at the time of measurement, they are not suited to address the old 
question of whether EC effects require conscious awareness of CS-US pairings during 
their presentation. As outlined by Gawronski and Walther (2012), the latter question 
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requires alternative approaches in which awareness of CS-US pairings is manipulated 
experimentally. Ideally, such studies would also include online measures of conscious 
awareness during the presentation of CS-US pairings (e.g., Baeyens et al., 1990; Purkis & 
Lipp, 2001) to resolve the identified ambiguities of recollective memory measures.  
 
Automaticity features: Awareness and beyond 
The preceding section shows that the role of contingency awareness remains a 
central topic in EC research. Yet, different from earlier studies on this question, 
contingency awareness is not studied for its own sake (i.e., to determine whether EC can 
occur unconsciously), but to gain information about the automatic (or non-automatic) 
nature of the processes underlying EC effects. Automaticity is often seen as an important 
dimension that distinguishes between different mental process models of EC, in particular 
associative versus propositional models (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). Recent approaches, however, do not conceptualize automaticity as a 
unitary concept. Rather, automaticity is an umbrella concept that encompasses multiple 
different features (e.g., Moors, & De Houwer, 2006). Whether participants have to be 
consciously aware of the stimulus pairings is therefore not the only relevant question 
regarding the automaticity of EC effects and their underlying mental processes. Thus, in 
line with more fine-grained conceptualizations, EC researchers have started examining 
automaticity features other than awareness, including the impact of goals (e.g., Corneille, 
Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & Mussweiler, 2009; Gast & Rothermund, 2011b; Verwijmeren, 
Karremans, Stroebe, & Wigboldus, 2012, this issue), attention (e.g., Blask, Walther, 
Halbeisen, & Weil, 2012, this issue; Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; 
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Kattner, 2012), and cognitive resources (e.g., Dedonder, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Kuppens, 
2010; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 2009; Walther, 2002). 
 
Possible future trends: Automaticity during acquisition and measurement 
Speculating about future trends is always a risky business. Yet, a relatively risk-
free prediction is that the trends that we have identified in recent research will continue to 
dominate research for the coming years. Although the adoption of functional definitions 
has led to major progress in ideas about the nature of EC and theorizing about its 
underlying mechanisms, the debate about the mental processes and representations that 
mediate EC is far from settled. Recent methodological advances and increased conceptual 
precision will likely be a great asset in testing the predictions of competing accounts. 
Because neuroscientific methods are gaining importance in virtually all areas of 
psychology, it also seems safe to assume that these methods will play a greater role in 
research on evaluative conditioning.  
There is, however, one prediction for which we want to go out on a limb. 
Although the idea that one should make a distinction between processes that operate 
during acquisition (i.e., when CS-US pairings are presented) and processes that operate 
during measurement (i.e., when the effects of CS-US pairings are tested) is certainly not 
novel, it is only recently that the implications of this idea have received more attention 
(e.g., Gast et al., this issue; Gawronski & Walther, 2012). Whereas previous research 
applied this distinction only to the role of contingency awareness in EC, we believe that it 
can provide important insights also into the influence of other features of automaticity. A 
clear methodological and theoretical distinction between the factors and processes that 
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have an influence during the presentation of CS-US pairings and those that have an 
influence during the measurement of CS evaluations could help to resolve some ongoing 
debates about the mental processes and representations underlying EC effects. If we 
accept the distinction between processes that operate during acquisition and those that 
operate during measurement, we should also accept the idea that both types of processes 
can possess different features of automaticity. In the following sections, we briefly 
discuss this issue with regard to two automaticity features: the goal-independence and 
resource-independence of EC effects. 
 
Goal independence 
When considering the impact of goals on processes or effects, a distinction can be 
made between proximal and distal goals. In the context of EC, proximal goals are those 
that relate to the impact of stimulus pairings on changes in liking, and thus directly to the 
EC effect. In contrast, distal goals can be conceptualized as goals that do not directly 
relate to the impact of stimulus pairings on liking, but may nevertheless influence EC 
effects. If EC effects are unaffected by proximal or distal goals, they can be described as 
goal-independent, and thus as automatic in this particular sense. Yet, EC effects would be 
goal-dependent, and thus non-automatic in this particular sense, if they are influenced by 
proximal or distal goals.  
There are several proximal goals that may be relevant for EC, including goals to 
produce or promote an effect or process and goals to stop or prevent an effect or process. 
If a proximal goal has an impact on EC (e.g., when the goal not to show an impact of 
stimulus pairings on liking eliminates or reduces EC), EC can be described as controlled 
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(Moors, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2010). However, when considering the distinction 
between processes that operate during acquisition and those that operate during 
measurement, it becomes clear that the concept of control can refer to either of these 
processes. For example, a preventive goal during the presentation of CS-US pairings 
could involve the goal not to be influenced by the pairings. In contrast, a preventive goal 
during the measurement of CS evaluations could be the goal to conceal the likes or 
dislikes that were acquired during the learning phase. Similarly, a promotive goal during 
the presentation of CS-US pairings could be the goal to learn the pairings well or to pay 
attention to all information relevant for the evaluation of the CSs. In contrast, a promotive 
goal during the measurement of CS evaluations could be to express or exaggerate likes 
and dislikes that are (or could have been) due to CS-US pairings. Balas and Gawronski 
(2012, this issue) provided evidence that the impact of proximal goals to promote versus 
prevent the influence of CS-US pairings at the time of measurement is moderated by 
contingency memory. In their research, instructions to maximize or minimize the 
influence of CS-US pairings moderated EC effects in line with task instructions. 
However, this influence was observed only when participants were able to recall the 
valence of the US that had been paired with a given CS. When participants failed to 
remember the valence of the US, significant EC effects emerged regardless of control 
instructions. 
Different from proximal goals, distal goals in EC can be described as goals that 
not directed at the impact of stimulus pairings on liking. A useful example of a distal goal 
can be found in the research by Verwijmeren et al. (2012, this issue). The authors showed 
that thirst (i.e., the goal to drink) moderates the relative strength of EC effects based on 
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goal relevant stimulus relations (beverage-disgusted face) as compared to goal irrelevant 
stimulus relations (beverage-fearful face). Similar to the proposed distinction for 
proximal goals, it is possible to consider the influence of a distal goal during the 
acquisition phase and the measurement phase. In the Verwijmeren et al. study, for 
example, participants‟ goal-state (i.e., their degree of thirst) was equivalent during the 
presentation of the CS-US pairings and during the measurement of CS evaluations. 
Hence, it is possible that the goal-state influenced EC effects through processes that 
operate during the presentation of CS-US pairings. However, it is also possible that thirst 
influenced EC effects during the measurement of CS evaluations (e.g., Ferguson & 
Bargh, 2004; Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007).  
 
Resource independence 
Another important feature of automaticity is resource-independence. A process or 
effect can be called resource-independent, or efficient, if it requires little or no attentional 
capacity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Moors et al., 2010). The resource-independence of 
a process or effect is typically demonstrated by showing that it is not disrupted through 
simultaneous performance of a secondary task. In contrast, a process or effect can be 
described as resource-dependent, and thus non-automatic in this particular sense, if it is 
disrupted by simultaneous cognitive activities. As with the operation of goals, a 
distinction should be made between the resource-independence of processes that operate 
during the acquisition phase and those that operate during the measurement phase.  
Research on the influence of secondary tasks during the presentation of CS-US 
pairings is relevant for the resource-independence of the processes that operate during the 
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acquisition phase (e.g., Dedonder et al., 2010; Pleyers et al., 2009; Walther, 2002). It has 
to be noted, however, that potential effects of a secondary task could also be due to 
differences in task-related goals. For example, comparing conditions in which 
participants are asked to rehearse an 8-digit string to conditions in which they are not 
asked to rehearse a digit string involves a confound between task-related goals and 
cognitive resources. A cleaner way of investigating the role of cognitive resources is to 
keep participants‟ goals constant across conditions, and to manipulate only the demands 
of the secondary task (e.g., by asking participants to rehearse an 8-digit string vs. a 2-
digit string). Furthermore, manipulating cognitive resources by means of attentional tasks 
might also influence the acquisition of conscious knowledge about the pairings. In such 
cases, the effect of the secondary task manipulation might be indirect in the sense that it 
is mediated by conscious knowledge about the pairings (Dedonder et al., 2010; Pleyers et 
al., 2009). These ambiguities require sophisticated methods to disentangle the effects of 
attention, goals, resources, and knowledge. An interesting example in this regard is a 
study by Blask et al. (2012, this issue) who manipulated attention in a bottom-up manner 
that is less likely to influence goals.  
Expanding on the question of whether EC effects are moderated by the 
availability of cognitive resources during the acquisition phase, another interesting 
question concerns the resource-independence of the processes during the measurement 
phase. A possible approach in this regard might be to compare results on implicit and 
explicit measures. Potential dissociations between the two kinds of measures, however, 
have to be interpreted with caution, because several other factors, and in particular the 
presence or absence of other automaticity features, might differentially influence 
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responses on the two kinds of measures (Moors et al., 2010). For example, whereas self-
presentation goals may influence EC effects on evaluative ratings, such goals are less 
likely to influence EC effects on evaluative priming tasks. Thus, a cleaner way to 
investigate the role of cognitive resources during the measurement phase would be to use 
identical measures under conditions of high versus low distraction by a secondary task 
(e.g., evaluative ratings while rehearsing an 8-digit string vs. a 2-digit string).  
 
This issue 
Many of the identified trends are reflected in the contributions that are featured in 
this Special Issue. In the final section of this article, we briefly summarize these 
contributions and relate them to the themes discussed above.  
Balas & Gawronski (2012, this issue) instructed participants to either maximize or 
minimize EC effects on valence ratings. The authors showed that this instruction 
influenced EC effects in line with task instructions. However, a moderating effect of task 
instructions was observed only for those CS-US pairs that were remembered by 
participants. These results suggest that participants can intentionally control EC effects 
on evaluative ratings. However, as pointed out by the authors, the set-up of their study 
allowed them to draw conclusions about the influence of intentional control during the 
measurement of conditioned CS evaluations, but not about the role of intentional control 
during the conditioning phase. Another important finding is that, while participants‟ 
ability to control EC effects depended on their memory of the CS-US pairings, the EC 
effect itself was independent of memory. In line with dual-process accounts of EC, this 
result may be interpreted as evidence for the operation of two distinct processes: one 
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process that depends on conscious knowledge of CS-US pairings and another one that is 
independent of such knowledge.  
Blask, Walther, Halbeisen, and Weil (2012, this issue) manipulated two attention-
related factors. One manipulation, described as top-down attention, involved the request 
to respond either to features of the CSs or to features of the USs. A second manipulation, 
described as bottom-up attention, involved presentations of the CSs and USs either in the 
same modality (i.e., visual) or in different modalities (i.e., visual vs. auditory). Blask et 
al. found significant effects of both factors, such that conditions that facilitated attention 
to both stimuli produced stronger EC effects. However, whereas the effect of the top-
down manipulation was mediated by recollective memory of the CS-US pairings, this 
was not the case for the effect of the bottom-up manipulation. In terms of the reviewed 
automaticity features, the top-down effect suggests that EC effects can be influenced by a 
goal to attend to and respond to the CS versus the US during the presentation of CS-US 
pairings. Moreover, the bottom-up manipulation is interesting, because to our knowledge 
it is the first demonstration of an attention effect that is difficult to attribute to the 
operation of a goal. Because both the bottom-up and the top-down manipulation were 
implemented during presentation of CS-US pairings, the results provide insights into the 
influence of these factors on the acquisition of conditioned evaluations. 
Verwijmeren, Karremans, Stroebe, and Wigboldus, (2012, this issue) investigated 
the influence of a goal to drink (thirst) on the liking of beverages that were paired with 
USs that were either relevant (disgusted faces) or irrelevant (fearful faces) for the goal to 
drink. Their results showed that the disliking of the beverage paired with a goal-relevant 
US compared to the beverage paired with a goal-irrelevant US was stronger for thirsty 
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than non-thirsty participants. These results provide insights into how goal states can 
moderate EC effects for goal-relevant stimuli. In these studies, the goal was active 
throughout the entire experiment. Therefore, it might have influenced EC effects through 
processes during the presentation of the stimulus pairings or during the measurement of 
CS evaluations (or both). 
Gast, De Houwer, and De Schryver (2012, this issue) were particularly interested 
in the role of conscious knowledge of CS-US pairings during the measurement of CS 
evaluations. Although a positive relation between EC effects and knowledge of CS-US 
pairings has been shown in numerous studies, it is unclear whether this effect reflects the 
use of conscious knowledge during the expression of an evaluation or the role of 
conscious knowledge at earlier processing stages (e.g., during the CS-US pairings), 
which might decay over time. By measuring CS-US knowledge twice with a delay of 
several days, the authors demonstrated the relevance of contingency knowledge during 
the measurement of CS evaluations.  
Unkelbach, Stahl, and Förderer (2012, this issue) investigated generalization in 
EC by testing whether CSs still produced significant EC effects when their visual 
appearance was modified to varying degrees. Although recognition accuracy for the 
modified stimuli remained at a very high level, EC effects emerged only for those CSs 
that were identical during learning and testing, but not for modified CSs. Moreover, when 
distinguishing between remembered and non-remembered pairs, this pattern emerged 
only for remembered CS-US pairs, suggesting that both memory and unchanged CS 
appearance were necessary preconditions for EC effects in this study.  
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Perugini, Richetin, and Zogmaister (2012, this issue) investigated the potential 
impact of CS features on EC effects, more specifically whether EC effects are moderated 
by the pre-existing valence of the CSs. To address this question, the authors used a 
variant of the self-referencing task, a paradigm in which CSs and USs are not paired 
directly in a spatio-temporal manner, but indirectly through a shared key response. The 
authors showed that both neutral and valenced CSs can be conditioned with this task, and 
these effects were shown on both explicit and implicit measures. 
Glaser and Walther (2012, this issue) investigated the influence of mixed-
valenced USs. Toward this end, they used a picture-picture paradigm with portraits to 
investigate how evaluatively inconsistent features of the USs might differentially 
influence CS and US evaluations. Neutral CSs were paired with USs that varied in terms 
of their valence on a behavioral (drug use vs. no drug use) and a group-related dimension 
(membership in a likeable vs. a dislikeable group). The authors showed that, while the 
first US feature (drug use vs. no drug use) dominated the evaluation of the USs, the 
second US feature (membership in a likeable vs. dislikeable group) dominated the 
evaluation of the CSs they were paired with. 
Finally, Zanon, De Houwer, and Gast (2012, this issue) investigated the 
moderating influence of contextual information on EC effects by presenting CS-US pairs 
as part of a slot machine game in which pairs of meaningless words were paired with 
winning and losing outcomes. In addition, participants were presented with context 
stimuli that implied the presence of a rule. Depending on the particular condition, this 
rule suggested an evaluation of the CS that was either congruent or incongruent with the 
valence of the US it was paired with. The authors showed that context cues that suggested 
INTRODUCTION  26 
 
 
a reversed CS valence attenuated EC effects on different implicit measures. The authors 
argue that these findings are consistent with both a dual-process account and a single-
process propositional account of evaluative conditioning. Yet, they are inconsistent with 
a single-process associative account. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the past few years, research relying on functional definitions has produced 
significant insights into the nature of and the processes underlying EC. Although the 
question of how EC should be defined is still under debate, functional definitions greatly 
facilitated empirical tests of competing accounts by clearly distinguishing between EC as 
an effect and the mental processes and representations that underlie this effect. Increased 
methodological sophistication and the adoption of meta-conditional approaches have 
been instrumental in testing hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying EC, and these 
developments will likely shape EC research over the coming years. We assume that the 
distinction between processes that operate during acquisition and processes that operate 
during measurement will play a major role in this regard, with a particular focus on 
whether these processes operate in an automatic or non-automatic fashion. This Special 
Issue features a strong selection of articles that are characteristic for these trends, offering 
important new insights into topics such as the role of automaticity features in EC (e.g., 
conscious knowledge, goal-dependence, controllability), the relevance of stimulus 
characteristics (e.g., neutrality of CSs, mixed valence USs, CS feature similarity), and the 
influence of contextual information (e.g., contextual cues about CS-US relations). 
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1
An important difference between the definition by De Houwer (2007) and most other 
definitions is that the former does not refer to the initial valence of the stimuli that are 
paired. Requiring that one of the stimuli has to be valenced takes into account what is 
seen as the prototypical case of EC, but it also imposes a priori restrictions on its 
properties. For example, if EC is limited to changes in liking of neutral stimuli that are 
paired with valenced stimuli, phenomena such as sensory pre-conditioning (i.e., a change 
in liking of CS1 after experiencing CS1-CS2 trials that are followed by CS2-US trials; 
e.g., Hammerl & Grabitz, 1996; Walther, 2002) would not qualify as instances of EC. A 
further difference between the definition by De Houwer and some other definitions is that 
it does not refer to the direction in which liking changes. Hence, even instances in which 
the change in liking of a stimulus is not in the direction of the existing valence of the 
other stimuli qualify as instances of EC (i.e., reverse EC effects). 
2
A similar argument is sometimes made against the use of stimulus pairings that suggest 
the presence of propositional processes. For example, the effects of pairing an image of a 
person (CS) with a word denoting a personality trait (US) might be rejected as an 
instance of EC, because it suggests a specific relation between the person and the 
personality trait (i.e., that person possesses the trait). Similar to our arguments about 
instruction effects, we argue that the absence of propositional processes is not a suitable 
criterion for defining EC effects. 
